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III.

Statement of the Case
This is an appeal from the decision of the magistrate court regarding pre-trial motion
issues. Please note that Trooper Talbott, the arresting officer in this matter and the operator of
the LifeLoc breath device, is the same trooper that stopped Mr. Besaw on 21 sl Street in Lewiston
while Mr. Beyer's stop occurred in the Lewiston Orchards. See Besaw v. ITD, Supreme Court
Case #39759-2012 and Beyer v. ITD, Supreme Court Case #39886-2012. The LifeLoc is the
device used in both cases.

Party Reference
The State is referred to as the "State" for the purposes of this argument. Mr. Besaw is
referred to by name.

Standard of Review
The appellate courts have determined that the standard of review ofa suppression motion
is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the reviewing court will
accept the trial court's findings of fact when they are supported by substantial evidence, but the
court will freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts found. At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh
evidence, and draws factual inferences is vested with the trial court. State v. Kinser, 141 Id. 557,
559, 112 P.3d 845, 847 (Ct. App. 2005).
Under the 4th Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal
behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being operated
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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contrary to traffic laws. See also Article 1, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution which is the
counterpart to the 4th Amendment of the United States Constitution. State v. Grigg, 149 Id. 361,
362, 233 P.3d 1283 (Ct. App. 2010).
Please also note the standard of review for the admissibility of an expert testimony is
discretionary with the trial court and absent an abuse of discretion, the decision will not be
disturbed on appeal. See State v. Smith, 135 rd. 712,23 P.3d 786 (Ct. App. 2001). In addition
on review of a decision of the District Court rendered in its appellate capacity, the court on appeal
will review the decision of the District Court directly. The Court will examine the magistrate's
record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the
magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions oflaw flow from those
findings. Ifthose findings are so supported and the conclusions flow therefrom and if the District
Court affirmed the magistrate's decision, the appellate court will affirm the District Court
decision as a matter of procedure. State v. Healy, 151 Id. 734,264 P.3d 75 (Ct. App. 2011).
Issues presented deal with whether the officer's actions constitute compliance with
foundational prerequisites set out in the standards for breath testing and field sobriety tests. These
are questions oflaw over which an appellate court exercises free review. State v. Carson, 133 Id.
451, 988 P.2d 225 (CL App. 1999).
IV.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceeding

On January 16,20] 1, George Besaw, Jr., was driving in Lewiston with a Class A Idaho
driver's license. The arresting officer, ISP Trooper Jeffrey Talbott, indicated that a white 1995
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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colored Ford FIS0 failed to maintain it's line and failed to signal southbound on 21 st Street at
approximately 16th A venue in Lewiston, Nez Perce County, State of Idaho. The arresting officer
recorded his contact with the vehicle and the occupants. The Court can note the weather
conditions from the video. Trial Exhibit 7. It was cold, rainy and wet.
The officer could smell the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle.
The driver identified himself as George 1. Besaw, Jr. After running a record's check, the driver
was requested to exit the vehicle to perform the standard sobriety evaluations.
Trooper Talbott was first certified as a breath testing specialist and operator on the Lifeloc
device in October of 2008. Motion Hearing T. at p. 31. He was re-certified in August of2010.
Motion Hearing T. at p. 31, Motion Hearing Exhibit 1. He testified at the time of the hearing that
after his training in August of20 10, new versions of SOPs were issued. The current version was
issued in November of 2010. He did not receive any training on the SOP that was issued in
November of 2010.

Motion Hearing T. at pp. 34, 39.

The trooper indicated he had no

involvement in writing the SOP or other m311Uals generated by the ISP Forensic Services. Motion
Hearing T. at p. 38.
During the course ofthe hearing, the trooper was asked questions regarding the conditions
of the area where the field sobriety tests were conducted, the slope of the parking lot where they
were conducted, and the weather conditions. Motion Hearing T. at pp. 26-28, 108.
The trooper conducted the horizontal gaze nystagnus walk and turn and one leg stand in
adverse weather conditions. Motion Hearing Exhibit 7. Mr. Besaw was arrested after the field
sobriety test were completed. He was placed in the back of the trooper's car, handcuffed with his
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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hands behind him with his feet in front of him. The trooper read him the Notice of Suspension.
The trooper did not read the language that is in the bottom portion of the middle section of the
advisory, the language states as follows: "THIS SUSPENSION FOR FAILURE OR REFUSAL
OF THE EVIDENTIARY TESTeS) IS SEPARATE FROM ANY OTHER SUSPENSION
ORDERED BY THE COURT." Motion Hearing T. at p. 90.
The trooper read the advisory to Mr. Besaw but did not give him a copy of said form at
the scene. Motion Hearing T. at pp. 89-90. The trooper did not video the back seat of the contact
with Mr. Besaw until after the breath testing had been completed. Motion Hearing T. at p. 86,
Motion Hearing Exhibit 7. The trooper indicated he was positioned outside the vehicle standing
and bent over some of the time. Motion Hearing T. at pp. 93-99. The trooper was asked
questions about Mr. Besaw and his CDL license and what he had advised Mr. Besaw regarding
the license suspension for a Class A license. Motion Hearing T. at p. 91.
During the IS-minute observation period, while the trooper was standing outside his
vehicle with Mr. Besaw handcuffed with his hands behind him and feet forward, the trooper had
to deal with the window wipers going, the noise of21 st Street, the interruption of Lewiston police
officers on two different occasions and his discussion with those police officers regarding the new
advisory form and directing them to retrieve the new advisory form from the front seat of his
vehicle. Motion Hearing Exhibit 7, Motion Hearing T. at pp. 93-99. The trooper had to deal with
one of the passengers getting out of the vehicle and coming towards the trooper's vehicle. Motion
Hearing T. at pp. 97-98. The trooper had to deal with the wife of the other passenger coming
forward to the vehicle after exiting her car which she drove to the China Inn parking lot. Motion
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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Hearing Exhibit 7, Motion Hearing T. at pp. 98-99. The trooper made eye contact with the
Lewiston police officers, and he could not guarantee that he was bent over the whole IS-minute
observation period. Motion Hearing T. at pp. 86-87,93-94. The trooper indicated that he had to
yell at the passenger to stay at the vehicle. Motion Hearing Exhibit 7.
The breath test result was a .219, insufficient, .201. Motion Hearing Exhibit 5.
The November, 2011, SOP requires a .20 performance verification for breath tests over
.20. Motion Hearing Exhibit 3. SOP, section 5.1.3 states:
"A performance verification of the Alca sensor and Lifeloc FC20 instruments
using a .08 or a .20 performance verification must be performed within twenty
four hours, before or after a evidentiary test to be approved for evidentiary use.
Multiple breath alcohol tests may be covered by a single performance verification.
Reference 5.1.4.1 for clarification on the use of the .20 solution in this capacity."
Section 5.1.4 states:
"A .20 performance verification should be run and results logged once
every calendar month and replaced with the fresh solution approximately
every twenty five verification or until it reaches its expiration date, which
ever comes first.

NOTE: The .20 performance verification was implemented for the sole
purpose of supporting the instrument results of a 18-8004 C charge.
Failure to timely perform a .20 performance verification will not invalidate
tests performed that yield results at other levels or in charges other than
18-8004 C."
Section 5.1.4.1 states: "The .20 performance verification satisfies the requirement for
performance verification within twenty four hours, before or after an evidentiary test at any level.
The .20 performance verification solution should be not used routinely for this purpose." The
SOP does not have language that allows for a .08 solution to be run at "any level" like the .20
solution.
APPELLANT'S BRlEF
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The instrument log sheet for the unit used on Mr. Besaw notes that a performance
verification was done at 4 :27 a.m. on January 16, 2011, using the .08 solution with test results of
.073/.073, lot number 10802, bottle 0353. Motion Hearing Exhibit 4. Mr. Besaw was arrested
and charged with a DUI.
E-mail exchanges regarding the changes in the SOP were admitted into evidence and were
attached to the closing argument with bate stamped numbers for ease of reference. R. at pp. 198303.
Mr. Besaw filed a motion to suppress. R. at p. 61. The hearing was held on May 6,2011.
The trial court took the testimony of the arresting trooper. T. at pp. 21-134. The trial court
entered an order denying the relief requested. R. at pp. 407-422. Mr. Besaw had a trial and was
convicted. An appeal was made to the District Court regarding the issues set out at the hearing
to suppress. The District Court upheld the magistrate's decision. R. at pp. 639-651. This appeal
followed. R. at p. 652.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

6
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON. IDAHO 8;;1501

v.
Issues Presented on Appeal
1.

Whether the trial court erred by not suppressing the breath test.
1(a).

There was a failure to comply with the standard operating procedure requirement
of a 0.20 solution performance verification within twenty four (24) hours of Mr.
Besaw's breath samples.

1(b).
2.

There was not a proper fifteen (15) minute observation period conducted.

Whether the trial court erred by not suppressing the field sobriety test or limiting the use
of lield sobriety tests by the State.

3.

Whether the trial court erred in its failure to find a lack of standards in breath testing as
required by the Idaho Code § 18-8004(4).

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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VI.
Argument
1(a).

THE TROOPER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE STANDARD OPERATING
PROCEDURE REQUIREMENT OF A 0.20 SOLUTION PERFORMANCE
VERIFICA TION
Mr. Besaw was arrested by Trooper Talbott on January 16, 2001. Mr. Besaw blew a
0.219, insufficient and a 0.201 breath test.

Motion Hearing Exhibit 5. The performance

verification check was run with a O.S solution. Motion Hearing Exhibit 4. Idaho Code (I.C.) §
1S-S004(4) requires that breath testing be run pursuant to standards developed by the ISP. The
Court can also note the IDAPA rules that require standards be put into place.

IDAPA

11.03.01.014.03.
The Lifeloc reference manual specifically indicates that it is not a standard. Motion
Hearing Exhibit 2 at p. 4 of 34. The only I.C. § 1S-S004( 4) standards that are currently in place
are found in the SOP. Motion Hearing Exhibit 3. The Court can note that there are certain
definitions found in the Lifeloc reference manual. Calibration is defined as: "In the field this
menu is used to run performance verification checks, also known as wet checks or calibration
checks.

Actual re-calibration of the instrument is done by the ISP labs and is password-

protected". Motion Hearing Exhibit 2 at p. 9 of 34. There is a definition of performance
verification which states: "Your agency may require that only BTS handle the performance
verification checks. Don't attempt performance verification checks unless you have been trained
in the proper procedure. Motion Hearing Exhibit 2 at p. 24 of 34. The Court will find none of
this in the SOP.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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The Court can read the manual and note what the machine is supposed to register
regarding calibration and what was done in this particular circumstance. Motion Hearing Exhibit
2. There is no indication of another 0.20 solution check after August 26, 2009. Motion Hearing
Exhibit 5.
Please review what is set out in the Lifeloc manual, Motion Hearing Exhibit 2 at page 31
of 34. The printout (Motion Hearing Exhibit 5) is inconsistent with the SOP (Motion Hearing
Exhibit 3). There is no verification from the Lifeloc itself that there was ever a 0.20 solution
check after August 26, 2009. However compare with the log sheet that notes a.20 solution check
at the beginning of the month. Motion Hearing Exhibit 4. There is no explanation why the
Lifeloc did not register the .20 solution change noted on the log sheet.
The SOP is currently the only ISPFS standard. Motion Hearing Exhibit 3. It does not
have any definition of calibration other then noting that it is a word that is used to define a
performance verification or simulator check. Motion Hearing Exhibit 3, SOP, at p. 2 01'21. The
Court can note there is a different procedure that is set out for minors in possession or
consumption. Motion Hearing Exhibit 3 at 19 of 21. Paragraph 8.1 has a totally different set-up
and does not make a distinction between the breath instruments compared to paragraph 6.2.
Motion Hearing Exhibit 3 at p. 15 of 21. Why there is a difference and why there is a distinction
between the process that is found at 8.1 versus the process that is found in section 6.2 is not
explained in the SOP.
There was not a 0.20 solution verification check within 24 hours of Mr. Besaw's test.
Motion Hearing Exhibit 4. The SOP that was in place at the time has a requirement that there be
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a 0.20 performance verification within 24 hours. Motion Hearing Exhibit 3. 5.1.4 of the SOP
(Motion Hearing Exhibit 3) specifically notes that the 0.20 performance verification was
implemented for the sole purpose of supporting the instruments results for an lS-S004C
charge, in other words, a blow over .20. (emphasis added) Failure to timely perform a 0.20
performance verification will not invalidate tests performed that yield results at other levels or
in charges other then lS-S004C. (emphasis added). Motion Hearing Exhibit 3. There is no
such rule for a 0.80 solution for an excessive breath test. It is clear that for a 0.20 blow, there
has to be a 0.20 performance verification within 24 hours of the test. SOP rule 5.1.4.1 states,
"The 0.20 performance verification satisfies the requirement for performance verification within
24 hours, before or after an evidentiary test at any level." Motion Hearing Exhibit 3 at p. 10 of
21.
The court must apply the rule oflenity found in State v. Mills, 128 Id. 416, 913 P.2d. 1196
(et. App. 1996), in the application of these sections of the SOP. The whole reason for using such
a solution is to determine the accuracy of the instrument at a OAO breath test, a 0.80 breath test,
and a 0.20 breath test, which are all statutory limits developed by the legislature. State's Exhibit
A. The rule of lenity must be applied requiring a .20 performance verification within 24 hours.
See also Matter of Virgil, 126 Id. 946, 947, 895 P.2d, 82 (1995).
The Mills court held in interpreting statutes, rules and regulations the following: "Under
the rule of lenity, criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the accused. (cites
omitted) The same principle of construction that apply to statutes apply to rules and regulations
promulgated by administrative agencies." (Cites omitted) At. p. 429.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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In this particular circumstance, pursuant to the log sheet, the arresting officer ran a
performance verification on the Lifeloc using the .08 solution. Motion Hearing Exhibit 4. Mr.
Besaw's breath test was noted as .219, insufficient and .201. Motion Hearing Exhibit 5. Mr.
Besaw had an excessive breath test result and so the failure of the operator to comply with the
standards set out by Idaho State Pol ice Forensic Services and Idaho Code § 18-8004(4) and Idaho
Code § 18-8002A(7)(d) required the magistrate to strike the breath test. He did not do so. The
District Court upheld the lower court's decision. R. at p. 645.
It should also be noted that § 5.1.4.1 of the SOP specifically allows the .20 solution to be
run for verification for any breath test result even though it is not recommended. However, there
is no indication that .08 performance verification can be run for a 0.20 or above breath result. Use
of the .08 solution in this case is in violation of SOP for a .20 or above breath result. It is clear
that arresting officer/operator/breath testing specialist failed in the requirements ofthis breath test
and performance verification. The failure to use the 0.20 solution also violates linearity which
is discussed below in Section II.

l(b).
THERE WAS NOT A PROPER 15 MINUTE OBSERVATION PERIOD
CONDUCTED.
There has to be a 15 minute observation period prior to breath testing. See State v. Stump,
146 Idaho 857 (Ct. App. 2009). The Stump case points to the specific standard of observation
required. See also Wheeler v. Idaho Transportation Department, 148 Idaho 378, 223 P.3d, 761
(CL App. 2(09).
In Stump, the driver was transported to the Teton County Sheriff s office to test his breath
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alcohol using an Intoxilyzer 5000. The arresting officer was in the same room with Mr. Stump.
The Court noted that there was no evidence in the record of any circumstances or conditions
inside the room which might have interfered with or impaired the arresting officer's senses.
Officer Hurt also advised Mr. Stump to tell him if he had belched or regurgitated during the 15
minute wait.
In Mr. Besaw's case, the arresting officer did not tell Mr. Besaw that he needed to advise
the officer if he actually belched, burped, or the like. The sense of smell is not helpful in this
case. What would a burp smell like, alcohol? Did not the trooper say Mr. Besaw smelled of
alcohol? Motion Hearing T. at pp. 105-106. In Wilkinson v. lTD, 151 Idaho 784, 264 P.3d. 680
(Ct. App. 2(11), the Court in footnote 4 discussed the issue of being instructed not to belch:
"Although the officer did not do so in this case, it would enhance law
enforcement procedures to simply ask the suspect if she belched, burped,
vomited, or did anything else during the waiting period that might skew
the test results. Previous cases have taken note of whether or not the
officer addressed such type of question to a subject. See e.g. Stump, 146
Idaho at 861, 203 P.3d at 1260; Carson, 133 Idaho at 452,988 P.2d at
226. "
At p. 684.
The question of observation was before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled
against the driver. FIowever, the Wilkinson breath test took place in a concrete room designed
for breath testing. There were three video cameras capturing the events as they OCCUlTed. The
hearing officer viewed these recordings before making his decision. In addition, there was
another female officer in the room standing directly behind Wilkinson during the period of time
Officer Davis had his back turned to Wilkinson. Wilkinson under scores the problems that are
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found in Mr. Besaw's case regarding the observation period. Trooper Talbott did not ask
Mr. Besaw ifhe burped, belched, or the like. The trooper did not videotape the events as was
found in the Wilkinson case. The court does not need a Homer Simpson burp on the audio to
question the observation period. The trooper could have video taped the testing sequence but
chose not to.
In the Magistrate's decision he cited to State v. Remsberg, 126 Idaho 338,882 P.2d 993,
(Ct. App. 1994) to support his decision that the 15 minute observation period was followed. R.
at p. 414. Ffowever the Remsberg decision isn't helpful at all if the Court looks at the at the facts
of Rembsberg.

In Remsberg, the officer transported Remsberg to the police station and

administered two intoximeter tests which showed BAC results of and 1.5 and 1.6. The test were
completed inside in the room designated for breath testing. Ms. Remsberg filed a motion to
suppress which the magistrate denied.

Officer Campbell in Remsberg testified that the

observation began at 11 :23 p.m., and 22 minutes later at, 11 :45 p.m., Campbell administered the
first intoximeter test.

Two minutes thereafter he administered the second test. Campbell

indicated during the seven minutes directly prior to administration of the first test, that he
programed the intoximeter, waited for the machine to warn1 up, and read the advisor form with
Remsberg while standing next to her. The record showed that Remsberg was actually seated next
to Campbell. The court found that Campbell did not have Remsberg under "continual direct
visual observation". The court in Remsberg found that Officer Campbell was in the same room
with Remsberg and observed her for at least 15 minutes before administering the breath test.
There is no indication of any outside wiper noise, rain, other officers distracting the officer from
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observing the driver. There is no indication of other passengers disrupting the observation period.
There is no indication of a passenger's wife coming on the scene or entering the intoximeter room
where Ms. Remsberg was seated. So how the magistrate in Mr. Besaw's case could compare
State v. Remsberg to the situation that Mr. Besaw found himself in on January 16,2011 is
unknown.
In addition, in Mr. Besaw's case, there was no video ofMr. Besaw once he was placed in
the back of the trooper's ISP vehicle.
In State v. Carson, 133 Id. 451,988 P.2d 225(Ct. App. 1999), the Court was faced with
a 15 minute wait that occurred in a law enforcement vehicle while the driver was being
transported to the Washington County Sheriffs Office to use the Intoxilyzer 5000. In that case,
Mr. Carson was asked ifhe had belched or vomited or burped, etc. during the drive. The arresting
officer said he intermittently observed Mr. Carson in the rearview mirror and listened for any
indication of belching or regurgitation. The arresting officer testified that because of the late hour
he encountered no traffic on the road and his police radio was quiet throughout the trip. The
officer then acknowledged during cross examination that is was raining and that the windshield
wipers were operating. The Court found that the arresting officer's attention was not devoted to
Mr. Carlson and that evidence presented at the motion hearing and common sense, tells us that
an officer's ability to use his hearing as a substitute for visual observation was impeded by noise
with the automobile engine, tires on the road, rain and windshield wipers.
In State v. DeFranco, 143 Idaho. 335, 338, 144 P.3d. 40, 43 (Ct. App. 2006), a similar
situation to Mr. Besaw's case is presented. DeFranco, the officer left the patrol car's rear door
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open and entered through the front passenger door, called dispatch momentarily and removed his
AlcoSensor equipment that had been on the front seat. He then walked to the rear of the vehicle,
opened the trunk and looked through a file box to find a advisory form.
During the 15 minute wait, Trooper Talbott was distracted by Lewiston police officers.
There is a specific reference to him telling them to leave him alone for the next four (4) minutes.
Motion Hearing Exhibit 7. Instead of them leaving him alone, they continued to talk to him and
he continued to talk to them. He directed them to get the advisory forms which were in his
vehicle. This is not a situation in which all of this is happening in an enclosed room like the
Intoxilyzer 5000 EN at the Nez Perce County Jail. Mr. Besaw was sitting in the vehicle, the door
was open, Trooper Talbott was standing outside talking to at least one Lewiston police officer
regarding the advisory form.
During the observation period and breath testing sequence, one of the passengers got out
of the vehicle and approached Talbott's vehicle. At that time, Trooper Talbott's attention was
directed to the passenger, due in part to officer safety since he was there by himself. His attention
was directed away from Mr. Besaw and towards the passenger. His sight and hearing were
directed towards someone other then Mr. Besaw. None of the case law cited herein requires that
the Driver prove that he burped. The Driver only has to prove that the 15 minute observation
period was not followed.
On top of all of these distractions, in the middle of the breath testing sequence, the
Trooper's attention was again directed away from Mr. Besaw and to the wife of one of the other
passengers who had arrived, exited her vehicle, and approached the police vehicle. In Mr.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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Besaw's case, there is the radio traffic from dispatch during the 15 minute wait. There is the noise
of the window wipers. There is the noise of passing traffic. There is no indication that a person
standing outside a vehicle, with someone sitting inside a vehicle, could smell anything such as
a burp or the like. Again, note the weather and the likelihood of using the sense of smell.
Obviously, the senses of touch and taste do not apply. The three senses that were applicable in
this case were distracted or not realistically focused on Mr. Besaw during the observation period.
The State may argue that the SOP has changed since the cases cited above were decided.
However, has the equipment changed? Have the manufacturers recommendations changed? Has
the science changed? Has Henry's law, the scientific foundation for breath testing, changed? The
only thing that has changed is ISP Forensic Services' decision to make "standards" discretionary.
The e-mails that are part of this record show why there is a change. However, there can be no
change regarding the mandatory 15 minute waiting period. "Proper testing procedure by certified
operators is necessary in order to provide accurate results." Motion Hearing Exhibit 3, SOP.
The current SOP requires "at least 15 minutes of observation" Motion Hearing Exhibit 3.
The Court has to wonder whether "should" really is discretionary when the SOP states as follows:
"Any material which absorbs/adsorbs or traps alcohol should be removed from the month prior
to the start of the 15 minute waiting period." (emphasis added) Motion Hearing Exhibit 3. IfMr.
Besaw had an apple in his mouth or a chew soaked with alcohol or a lemon or 12 marbles, does
the officer have discretion to allow that material to remain in the mouth during the wait period
and during the blow.

What about the following: "During the monitoring period the

subjectlindividual should not be allowed to smoke, drink, eat or belch/burp/vomit/regurgitate."
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Motion Hearing Exhibit 3, SOP. Again, ifMr. Besaw was smoking, drinking, eating, burping,
vomiting and regurgitating, could the breath samples be valid because the word "should" is used
in the SOP? Prior examples of the procedure of the 15 minute wait are as follows:
"Prior to evidential breath alcohol testing, the subject must be monitored
for fifteen (15) minutes. During this time the subject may not smoke,
drink, or chew gum, candy, food, or any tobacco product. A material
which absorbs/adsorbs or traps alcohol should be removed from the mouth
prior to the start of the fifteen minute waiting period." (emphasis added)
SOP 11/2006 Paragraph 3.]. See Wheeler at p. 768.
It is clear that this language including the "may not" and the "should" are all mandatory
requirements. If they are not, then someone could smoke and drink during the 15 minute wait,
and it would not have an effect on the breath test.
The Wilkinson, supra, court indicated, being in an enclosed room with multiple cameras
trained on the subject lends support to the position that there was not any burping, belching or
vomiting during this time. As the Court is aware, the ISP trooper in Besaw decided not to record
Mr. Besaw during the 15 minute wait. He could have, but he decided not too. He decided to start
recording after Mr. Besaw's breath testing sequence was completed. His credibility is at issue like
the officers noted in the following two cases, In the Interests of Doe, 130 Idaho 81], 815, 948
P.2d 166, 170 (Ct. App. 1997), State v. Dominguez, 137 Idaho 681,52 P.3d 325, (Ct. App. 2002)
(credibility of officers who fail to record).
The two valid breath samples were quite a distance apart, .219/.20l. The faet that the
samples had such a wide variance supports mouth alcohol in Mr. Besaw's first breath sample.
The log sheet notes other drivers and their breath samples which do not have the range found in
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Mr. Besaw's case. Motion Hearing Exhibit 4. (logsheet) The testing done on January 6, 2011,
.205/.202 and .072/.073, shows a separation of 0.003, 0.001, and no separation for the testing on

January 8, 2011, as both breath samples were 0.068. The testing of Boswell on January 16,2011,
notes a 0.049 and a 0.046. One would have to believe that something like mouth alcohol caused
the wide margin between the .219 and the .201 samples. There is a two minute wait after each
breath sample so the next valid breath sample would have been four minutes later. Motion
Hearing Exhibit 4.
The magistrate's conclusion is not supported by the record I. The appellate courts have
routinely reversed decisions regarding 15 minute observation periods associated with vehicles and
being outside.

The magistrate abused his discretion.

The Court should remand with an

instruction to suppress the breath test.
II.
THE FIELD SOBRIETY TEST SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED

The Trial Court missed the point of the argument. First of all, Idaho has never had a
I.R.E., Rule 702 hearing on field sobriety tests. The Idaho case law regarding the HGN field
sobriety test is suspect, but that is only part of the argument on this appeal. The Trial Court
ignored the argument dealing with the requirements for proper field sobriety testing. The Trial
Court should have suppressed the use of the field sobriety test because oflack of compliance with
the National standard. State v. Bish, 947 N .E.2d 257 (Ct. App. Ohio, 2010) and State v. Ito, 978

The magistrate stated hln the instant matter, the officer was within two to three feet of Defendant Besaw, was facing him at all times, putting
him in a physical position that allowed him to utilize not only hIS sight but all his senses to accomplish the purpose of the monitoring period,
which is to determine if a defendant belches, burps or vomits." R. at p. 416.
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P .2d 19] (Hawaii App. 1999). The trial court does not address any of the specific issues about
how the field sobriety tests were conducted on that rainy, cold January night. The Idaho Supreme
Court would not veer away from the majority of decisions of other states on the issue of validation
and use ofthe national standards. See People v. McKown, 924 N.E.2d 941, (Ill. 2010) and White
v. Miller, 724 S.E.2d 768 (W.Va. 2012).
The Court has the ability to review the video tape regarding the field sobriety test. Motion
Hearing Exhibit 7. Attached as Exhibit "C" to the brief below are pages from the NHTSA
Manual 2006. R. at pp. 527-544. On the horizontal gaze nystagnus, the officer's testimony was
that Mr. Besaw's pupils did not appear to be the same size. Motion Hearing T. at pp. 100-101,
109. The testimony indicated that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Manual
notes: "If the eyes do not track together, or if the pupils are noticeably unequal in size, the chance
of medical disorder or injuries the nystagnus is present". Motion Hearing T. at pp. 132-133. In
this case, the pupil size was obviously noticeable because the arresting officer put that in his
police report, which he testified to at the time of the hearing. Motion Hearing T. at p. 133.
Therefore, allowing the horizontal gaze nystagnus in as evidence would be improper. The
scientific aura behind the testing would prejudice Mr Besaw in front of a jury. With regard to the
"walk and turn" the court can note the slope that was present. The surface was not reasonably dry,
wasn't level and it was certainly slippery based on the amount of water that was present. The
same can be said for the "one-leg stand". The officer had no prior experience with Mr. Besaw
and would not know what his ability was to perform these field tests in normal conditions. It was
raining on that January night in 2011. The court can also note the difference in what the trooper
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was wearing and what Mr. Besaw was wearing.
The magistrate committed error by allowing the State to use the fIeld sobriety tests on the
grounds offoundation, relevance, and that their probative value was substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice. In one study, over 98% of roadside HGN tests were determined
to be not properly conducted.

See "End-Position Nystagmus as Indicator of Ethanol

Intoxication", Science & Justice Journal 20012. See United States vs. Horn, 185 F Supp 2d 530
(D.Md. 2002) and State vs. Lasworth 42 P.3d 844 (N.M. App., 2001). The appropriate test for
measuring the reliability of evidence is Rule 702 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. See State vs.
Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844 P.2d 691 (1992). In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court
questioned the precedential value of State vs. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 811 P.2d 488 (1991). The
Gleason Court affirmed that at most the arresting officer could testify that a nystagmus may only
be an indicator of intoxication, not that it is conclusive evidence. Moreover, such evidence cannot
be used "to establish or infer any particular correlative BAC level because nystagmus does stem
from other causes other than the ingestion of alcohol." See Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 104.
The Court of Appeals decision, State vs. Parkinson, 128 Idaho 29, 909 P.2d 647 (Ct. App.1996),
cites Gleason to say that the admission of expert testimony regarding scientific evidence is
governed by Rule 702, but goes on to "articulate the inquiry envisioned by Rule 702" discussing
Daubert VS. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc .. 502 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed.2d 469

2
Please note the many attachments to the written closing argument regarding the field sobriety testings failures.
United States vs. Horn, 185 F Supp 2d 530 (OMd 2002), Exhibit B of closing argument.
State vs. Lasworth 42 P3d 844 (NM App .. 2001), Exhibit C of closing argument
Schultz vs. State of Maryland, 665 A2d 60, 77 (1995) and a study by Spurgeon Cole, Exhibit 0 of closing argument.
The Atlidavit of Harold I' BruU in the case of United States vs. Horn, Exhibit E of closing argument
The Affidavit ofJoel P. Wiesen, Ph.D., Exhibit F of closing argument R. at pp. 306-404.
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(1993), for guidance. 128 Idaho, at p. 34. Such inquiry requires a preliminary assessment of
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of
whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts and issues (quoting
Daubert). (emphasis added) The Trial Court must make a preliminary assessment, factors to be
evaluated include: "Whether the theory or technic in question can be tested, whether it has been
subjected to peer review and publication, its known or potential error rate, the existence and
maintenance of standards governing its use, and whether it has attracted widespread acceptance
within a relevant scientific community. (quoting Dauber)" Parkinson at p. 34. The Court then
synthesized, "other courts and commentators" in listing these additional factors:
1) The presence of safeguards and the technique,
2) Analogy to other scientific techniques whose results are admissible,
3) The nature and breath of inferences drawn,
4) The extent to which the basic data are verifiable by the court and jury,
5) Availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique,
6) The probative significance of the evidence and the circumstances of the case.
(Cites omitted) Id.
However, the limitation in Parkinson, "just scientific expertise" has been overruled with
the decision in U. S. Supreme Court case, Kumbo Tire vs. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1169 (1999).
In that case, the Supreme Court answered the question posed by Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
Daubert vs. Merrell regarding scientific evidence. Answering affirmatively, in a fairly resounding
decision, Justice Breyer authored the near unanimous decision. The Court decided "how Daubert
applies to the testimony of engineers and other experts who are not scientists." Id., at p. 1171.
Answering this question, resolved a circuit split, where several circuits, notably the Third, Fifth,
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and Eighth had indicated that Daubert applied to all expert testimony while the Second, Ninth,
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits held that Daubert applies only to the admission of "scientific" expert
testimony. The Court concluded that Daubert's strictures apply not just to "scientific" evidence,
but to all forms of proposed expert testimony. Kumbo 119 S.Ct., at 1171, 1175.
The Kumbo Court, in stressing the importance ofthe gatekeeping function of a trial judge,
noted that its objective was to:
"ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony, to make certain that
an expeli, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal
experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field."
rd., at p. 1176.

While the Idaho Supreme Court has used a Rule 702 case-by-case test of reliability for
admission of cxpert testimony, the Court of Appeals has used Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and
similar factors, which include:
a) Whether the theory or technique in question can be tested;
b) Whether it has been subjected to peer review and pUblication;
c) Its known or potential error rate;
d) The existence and maintenance of standards governing its use; and
e) Whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific
community.
The Idaho Court of Appeals uses the following criteria that a trial court might consider
when analyzing scientific evidence:
a) The presence of safeguards in the techniques;
b) Analogy to other scientific techniques whose results are admissible;
c) The nature and breadth of inference drawn;
d) The extent to which the basic data are veriilable by the court and jury;
e) Availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique; and
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f) The probative significance of the evidence in the circumstances of the case.

State vs. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410,3 P .3d 535,(App. Ct. 2(00); Kumbo Tire vs. Carmichael, 119
S.Ct. 1169 (1999); State vs. Parkinson, 128 Idaho 29, 909 P.2d 647, (Ct. App. 1996).
The field sobriety tests administered in Mr. Besaw's case do not meet the requirements
of Daubert, Kumbo or Rule 702, nor can the arresting officer lay a sufficient foundation to admit
such evidence. Further, Mr. Besaw has no way to confront or challenge the officer's observations
of these presumed psychological or psychophysical reaction of eyes, therefore, such evidence
should not be allowed. Why not perform this test with a video camera closely recording the
actions of the officers and the person's face?
In using the case law set out herein, the Court must determine that the field sobriety tests
result lack reliability and do not follow the requirements of the Rule 702 standards. The factors,
as noted, cannot be met by the State in this case. The State called no expert to provide a
foundation pursuant to IRE 702. Tbe Court can also note cases from Kansas and Ohio. In State
vs. Witte, 836 P.2d 110 (Kansas 1992), the Kansas Court criticized states like Idaho for accepting
field sobriety tests based on State vs. Superior Court, 718 P. 2d 171 (Arizona). The Kansas Court
noted: "The Idaho Supreme Court also followed the Arizona opinion. The Idaho Court noted that
no evidence or publication had been presented that refuted the Arizona opinion." State vs.
Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 881, 811 P.2d 488 (1991). At pp. 1118 and 1119. The Kansas Supreme
Court went on to criticize the Arizona Court by outlining several contrary scientific studies that
dealt with the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. The Kansas Supreme Court concluded: "If the
Arizona Supreme Court had had the evidence before it, it may not have held that the HGN
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evidence satisfies the Frye admissibility requirements. The reliability of the HGN test is not
currently a settled position in the scientific community." At p. 1121.
The Court may be better able to understand Mr. Besaw's position by looking at Judge
Lansing's dissenting opinion in State vs. Mazzuca, 132 Idaho 868, 979 P.2d 1226 (CLApp. 1999).
This case dealt with the Intoxilyzer 5000 and the foundation for the evidence allowing the breath
result in. Judge Lansing stated:
"To bolster its holding that this foundation suffices, the majority opinion
relies upon several cases from other jurisdictions where the expert testimony
was more complete. In my view, this reliance is misplaced, for expert
testimony given in other cases cannot substitute for an evidentiary foundation
properly presented before the magistrate."
At p. 872.
Judge Lansing then went on to criticize the State vs. Garrett, supra, decision. She stated:
"Since then, the Idaho Supreme Court has made it crystal clear that the Frye test is not to be
utilized as the standard for admission of scientific or technical evidence. See State vs. Faught,
127 Idaho 873, 876, 908 P.2d 556 (1995). Rather, the proper standard is stated in I.R.E. 702."
At p. 872. Judge Lansing concluded her dissenting opinion by stating: "Thus, the admissibility
of the Intoxilyzer 5000 test at issue here turns upon the sufficiency of the foundational testimony
presented to the magistrate in this casc, not information contained in decisions from other
courts." (emphasis original) At p. 872. Moreover, the Court must note that nothing in Daubert,
Kumbo, Parkinson, and Rule 702 require the Court to admit opinion testimony that is connected
to existing data only by the ipse dixit of an expeli. Kumbo, at 1179.
In State vs. Homan, 732 N.E.2d 952,89 Ohio S1. 3d 421 (Ohio 2000), the Ohio Supreme
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Court stated in discussing the field sobriety test: "The small margins of error that characterized
field sobriety tests make strict compliance critical." At p. 956. Judge Gaskill ignored this point
in his decision. The Court continued: "The HGN test is not the only field sobriety test that
required special care in its administration." At p. 956. The Court concluded its holding by
stating: "In contrast we find that strict compliance with standardized field sobriety testing
procedures is neither unrealistic nor humanly impossible in the great majority of vehicle stops in
which the police choose to administer the test." At p. 957.
The Court of Appeals in State vs. Eytchison, 136 Idaho 210,30 PJd 988 (Idaho App.,
2001) commented on the use of an expert: "The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702." At. p. 990. The Trial Court in Mr. Besaw's case was required to
conduct a Rule 702 Parkinson, Kumbo, hearing to determine whether or not in this particular case
field sobriety tests are settled science, as required in Rule 702 and Idaho Criminal Rule 12(b).
The magistrate failed to do so. The Court of Appeals in the Eytchison case commented on the
change of the Federal Rule 702 regarding expert testimony. See p. 990, footnotes 1 and 2. See
also changes to Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(7).
In State vs. Garrett, (supra) the Court in a plurality opinion, determined the scientific
reliability of the horizontal gaze nystagmus. ChiefJustice Bakes concurred in the opinion while
Justice McDevitt concurred in the results only. Justice Boyle filed a special concurring opinion
rejecting the use of the ~ standard and Justice Johnson dissented. Justice Johnson advocated
a standard of independent reliability. Justice Johnson's dissent reflects what has been done by
the Idaho and Federal Courts in recent cases like Parkinson and Eytchison, Daubert and Kumbo.
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In State vs. Garrett, the Court stated: "Because the reliability of a test based on a scientifically
tested phenomenon should not vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, we examine what other
jurisdictions have done when HG test results are otIered as evidence in DUI cases." At p. 880.
In Footnote 3, the Court states: "Such 'decisions' are persuasive only as they contain
analysis and reasoning which recommend itself to this Court." At p. 880. The Garrett Court cited
State vs. Superior Court: "We have been furnished with no publications or other authority which
refutes the reasoned decision of the Arizona Court." At p. 881. It is submitted that Mr. Garrett's
counsel did not provide an adequate argument regarding filed sobriety tests. Mr. Besaw should
not be held accountable for the failures of Defendant counsel trom a 1991 decision. Justice
Johnson, in his dissent, lists succinctly the problems of the holding of the plurality when he stated:
"If this (the testimony of the arresting officer) establishes the reliability for
admissibility for expert opinion based on new scientific methods, then we
must be prepared to accept the admissibility of the results of the polygraph
examination based on the testimony of polygraph operators, the admissibility
of DNA tests based on the testimony of laboratory tec1micians who conduct
the tests, and the results of other forms of 'scientific' testing based on the
testimony of those who conduct the tests. In my view, this is not the type of
reliability that we should require before allowing testimony of the results of
tests conducted based on new scientific methods. The foundation should be
laid by experts who have researched the tests and are available to testify as
to the scientific basis for the test." (emphasis added)
At p. 885.
The State of Idaho has never provided said foundation with regard to field sobriety tests.
There has never been a true Rule 702 hearing as envisioned by Daubeli, Kumbo, Parkinson, or
Konechny.
The magistrate in supporting his decision regarding the field sobriety test, noted "after
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extensive analysis, the Idaho Supreme Court held in Garrett that HGN testing is reliable, generally
accepted in the scientific community, and admissible in DUI prosecutions for the limited purpose
of drawing certain inferences. R. at p. 412. The court in 1991 actually did very little analysis to
support HGN testing. No expert has ever testified regarding the reliability of the horizontal gaze
nystagnus or any other sobriety test for that matter, or at least not that's been reported. The State
has law enforcement officers testify as alleged experts.
There are cases from all over the country that limit or criticize the use of the horizontal
gaze nystagnus or field sobriety tests in general. R. at pp. 306-404. It has been noted that judicial
notice could become a yellow brick road for judicial acceptance of bogus or at least invalidated
scientific theories or techniques. R. at p. 189.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Garrett accepted standards that, even in the best
circumstances, (in the laboratory), have a 23% failure rate (HGN), a 32% failure rate (walk and
tum) and a 35% failure rate (one leg stand). There is a well written article by Phillip B. Price and
Sturgeon Cole in the April 21, 2001 magazine, The Champion published by the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. See Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 104. The authors
criticize the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration field sobriety test validation. The
author states:
"There has been no attempt to establish norms for the SFST. We have no
idea how well a sober person can perform on the SFST. How does age or
gender affect performance?
How does fatigue or practice affect
performance? If an individual performs poorly at a .11 % BAC, how does that
compare with his or her performance with a BAC of .OO%? Before any
individual's performance can be considered at 'test', that particular
individual's baseline with no alcohol must be known and factored in.
Without answers to these basic questions, the SFST remains in the same
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category as tarot cards." (emphasis added)
At p. 42.
The authors then go on to discuss the number of false arrests:
"Of the sober individuals that were involved in the Colorado, Florida and San
Diego studies, the officers falsely arrested 24%, 18% and 29%, respectively.
That is an average of 23.6% false arrest rate. What this means is that if the
SFST are used as a decision of whether to arrest an individual for an alcohol
related offense, one out of every four sober people will be falsely arrested."
(emphasis added)
At p. 42.
In the State vs. Gleason, case, no real "expert" was called. As Justice Johnson indicated
in Garrett, the "expert" in question was the individual who conducted the test. In Gleason, Justice
Bistline in his concurrence in result states: "The majority's bare statement that LR.E. 702 is the
appropriate test provides no guidance to the bench and bar as to how to determine scientific
reliability." Justice Bistline then questions the use of Rule 702 by stating:
"Questions that corne to mind include: What level of scientific reliability, if
any, is required before evidence will assist the trier of fact? What constitutes
scientific reliability? How reliable does scientific evidence have to be before
it is admissible? On whose scale do we measure the amount of reliability?
What unit of measurement is being used'?"
At p. 67.
The State may argue that Mr. Besaw is trying to overturn prior precedent. The use of
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 is supported by Gleason. However, the use of a Rule 702 analysis
is lacking, but can be expanded as required by federal case law and the Idaho cases that have
accepted the federal court reasoning. A Trial Court must do more under its gatekeeping function
before any field sobriety test should be allowed before a jury.
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In State vs. Ito, 978 P .2d 191 (Hawaii App. 1999) the Court determined that the horizontal
gaze nystagmus test had a 23% error rate in detecting individuals with a BAC of. 1% or greater
and a 35% error rate in detecting persons with a .08% BAC or greater. At p. 203. The Hawaiian
Court cited State vs. O'Key, 899 P.2d 687 (Oregon 1995). The Oregon Court noted that part of
the training the officers had to undergo required them to ask, before administering the HGN test,
whether the person had a head injury, was ill or was taking medication. The officer in Hawaii had
a whole series of questions that were required to be asked before the HGN test could be required.
Ito at p. 204. No such questions were asked of Mr. Besaw. The HaM'aiian Court noted as to
whether the HGN test is susceptible to abuse, one of the criticisms leveled at the test is that,
"It is wholly subjective - the police officer has no physical sample to take to
the laboratory. Thus, the suspect is not able to have his or her expert examine
the evidence .... [and] cannot contradict the officer's testimony[.] (Cite
omitted), in our view, however, this concern is minimized as long as the
HGN test results are limited solely to probable cause determinations."
(emphasis added)

At p. 204.
In Mr. Besaw's case, the State does not want the field sobriety tests limited to a probable
cause determination, but used as evidence to prove intoxication beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Hawaiian Court in vacating the Trial Court's determination of probable cause on the HGN test
noted that officers are required to check themselves "monthly with an [8x15 square template or
cardboard with a diagonal line drawn from one corner to another to demark 45 degrees] to be sure
that your accuracy has been sustained."

Footnote 10 at p. 210. The Court also noted the

warnings set out in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration manual:
"ONLY

WHEN
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PRESCRIBED STANDARDIZED MANNER; AND ONLY WHEN THE
STANDARDIZED CLUES ARE USED TO ASSESS THE SUSPECT'S
PERFORMANCE; AND, ONLY WHEN THE STANDARDIZED
CRITERIA ARE EMPLOYED TO INTERPRET THAT PERFORMANCE.
IF ANY ONE OF THE STANDARDIZED FIELD SOBRIETY TEST
ELEMENTS IS CHANGED, THE VALIDITY IS COMPROMISED."
At p. 210.
In the trial court's opinion regarding the field sobriety test, the Court does not even
address the issue involving the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration standards or any
of the cases cited in the closing argument regarding the use of the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration or the issues regarding failures to comply with the standards set out in the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration manual. The magistrate used State v. Ferreira,
133 Id. 474, 988 P.2d 700 (CL App. 1999) to support his decision regarding the issues found in
Mr. Besaw's case. The Ferreira case is not on point. The Ferreira case dealt with a constitutional
challenge to the expectation of privacy intruded upon by field sobriety tests and that probable
cause was required before such tests were administered. The Ferreira case has nothing to do with
the issues presented in this case regarding an I.R.E. Rule 702 challenge or a challenge regarding
the standards developed by the Nationalllighway Traffic Safety Administration regarding field
sobriety testing.
With regard to the National Highway Safety Administration standards, the District just
simply indicated that the standards for proper field sobriety testing were not relevant and
unnecessary. R. at p. 648, footnote 4. The District Court indicated that it found no error on the
part ofthe trial court for not addressing standards that are without legal affect in Idaho other than
they had been incorporated into Idaho case law, statutes, rules, and regulations. LR.E. Rule 702
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require science and standards. Even in the Garrett case, the court recognized the problems with
margin of error and the circumstances under which the test is administered at the roadside and the
fact that nystagnus maybe caused by conditions other than alcohol consumption. Garrett at p. 881.
There is not one case in the United States that counsel could find in which appellate courts have
not commented on or used the standards set by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration in regarding field sobriety tests. Basically the District Court is saying that these
field sobriety tests could come in no matter what the officer did or did not do in conducting the
field sobriety tests. What the District Court is suggesting is that a gatekeeper judge never has to
worry about how the field sobriety tests were conducted as long as the cop says "I did them right
and they show the requisite number of failures". This idea is not supported by one case in this
county and is not supported by any case law in the state ofIdaho, especially considering there are
standards that have been developed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. The
standards require that if the field sobriety tests are not done based on the standards, they are not
valid. It could not be clearer.
In this case, the standards were not followed and the field sobriety test should be
suppressed. The trial court simply ignored the evidence regarding the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration standards.
III.
ISPFS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE STANDARD REQUIREMENT OF IDAHO
CODE SECTION 18-8004(4)
Administrative regulations are subject to the same principles of statutory construction as
statutes. See Mason v. Donnelly Club, 135 Idaho 581, 586, 21 P.3d 903, 908 (2001). The court
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indicated that when interpreting a statute or a rule, it has to be construed as a whole to get the
intent of the Legislature or promulgating entity. The court has to use the literal words of the rule
and the words should be given their plain, obvious and rational meaning. In Wheeler v. Idaho
Transportation Department, 148 Idaho 378, 223 P.3d, 761 eCt. App. 2009), the court interpreted
the use of the word "should". One would have to believe that with the e-mails that are part ofMr.
Besaw's record, the Court of Appeals would have determined that the use of the word "should"
was just a "weasel word" to get around any mandatory requirement.
The court would be well served by reading Judge Lansing'S dissenting opinion. She
commented on the fact that ISP had not formally promulgated administrative rules prescribing
testing equipment or requirements for its maintenance and operation. She noted that the ISP
announced its approved breath methods through SOPs, and manuals. Judge Lansing wrote that
appellate courts have to treat such documents as "rules" for the purpose ofjudicial review because
they constitute the only materials by which the ISP has acted upon the I.e. §§ 18-8002A and 188004(4) authorization for breath testing standards. Judge Lansing noted: "But a "standard" that
is merely a recommendation, and hence optional, is no standard at all - it is merely something that
the officers maintaining and operating the Intoxilyzer 5000 may do ifthey wish or may disregard."
At p. 388. Judge Lansing indicated that if the rules weren't mandatory, then there could not be
any sort of standard: "This result, however, is obviously not what is intended by the ISP. The ISP
clearly did intend to promulgate standards, not just make optional, take or leave suggestions for
how an Intoxilyzer 5000 could be maintained and operated." At p. 389.
Judge Lansing was wrong in this assessment oflSP. Judge Lansing notes, in footnote no.
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7, the problem with the use of the term "approximately": "There is no need here to go into an
analysis of the propriety of using the term "approximately" in a rule that is supposed to be setting
defined standards, but the problems caused by its use are as obvious as the problems caused by
the use of "should". At p. 390.
One would have to assume that the Court of Appeals wouldn't be very happy with ISPFS
if they had access to all of these e-mails and the fact that the people in charge ofthe breath testing
program in Idaho simply want to use "vagueness", "weasel words", and "wiggle room". There are
no breath testing standards based upon science. Judge Lansing's dissenting opinion will become
the majority opinion once the court has access to these e-mails and the real thought behind the so
called "standards" used by ISPFS. The Wheeler court reviewed the mandatory provision of the
SOP at the time of the Wheeler ALS. Those mandatory provisions, like for the 15 minute
observation period, are now discretionary. See Motion Hearing Exhibit 3, Section 6.1 ("should"
instead of "must").
State v. Bell, 115 Idaho 36, 764 P.26 113 (CL App. 1988) interprets I.C. § 18-8004(4). The
statute allows alcohol results, either blood, breath or urine, to be introduced into evidence without
an expert testifying regarding the same. The Court of Appeals stated:
"The admissi bility of the result of a scientific test such as the blood-alcohol
test in I.e. § 18-8004 turns normally on a foundation which establishes the
acceptability, validity, reliability and accuracy ofthe test and test procedures.
In the admission of a test result for alcohol concentration the Legislature has
concluded that certain foundational elements need not be presented at trial
unless such elements are disputed. The Legislature has acknowledged that
certain tests, due to a history of reliability and accuracy, are presumed to be
valid and acceptable ... The Legislature has enacted a statutory scheme which
allows an expedient method for admitting a blood-alcohol test result into
evidence without the need for some expert testimony ... Inherent in this
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
33
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK

AND

FEENEY

LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

statutory scheme, however, is an awareness by the Legislature ofthe need for
uniform test procedures. An "extremely reliable" test result can only be the
product of a test procedure which from previous use is known to be capable
of producing an accurate result. This benefit is best provided by strict
adherence to a uniform procedure. This was recognized by the Legislature and
is apparent first, from the statutory language which provides for the test
procedure to be determined by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare,
and second, by the "shall" language mandating adherence to the standards set
by that Department."
At p. 39.
The e-mails that were produced, based on freedom of information requests, regarding the
changes to the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) are replete with the use of vague language,
"wiggle room", and "weasel words 3 ". ISP Forensic Services (ISPFS) has determined that it is
more interested in getting past legal challenges then setting up scientific standards that will follow
the requirements of Bell and

I.e.

§ 18-8004(4). Also, it's clear that Skylar Anderson, who was

under investigation by ISPFS was instrumental in adapting the SOP and reference manuals that
were in place at the time Mr. Besaw was tested. The court can go through the e-mails and note
that the people that are making suggestions are not scientists. There is very little science discussed
in these e-mails that were generated regarding the changes to the SOPs.
The court can look at the e-mail from Matthew Garnette which notes that there are a
couple of changes he would like to make to the IDAPA rules. R. at p. 199. lie states: "They are
fairly minor, but are causing all kinds of issues in court." Why is ISPFS worrying about court
issues? ISPFS should be worried about scientific standards and not what makes life easier for

3
Note E-mails are bate stamped for ease of reference and are attached to the written closing argument. The e-mails were made part of the
record at the hearing on May 13, 20 II

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

34

LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83S01

prosecutors, ALS hearing officers and police officers.
There is a discussion involving Skylar Anderson and the use ofthe term "approximately".
R. at p. 200. There is a discussion regarding the MIP/MIC procedure as simply being a best
practices provision and not a standard. R. at p. 202. There is an e-mail from Eric Moody to Mr.
Garnette, noting that he is one of the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) hearing officers.
R. at p. 203. He notes that two (2) attorneys during oral argument noted problems with the SOP
that was in effect for that particular set ofDUIs. The issue involved the two (2) minutes standard
between breath samples.
ALS hearing officers have no business making these sorts of comments or participating
in scientific standards being developed for Idaho. ISPFS laboratory officials are not above hiding
and cheating as noted in the Brady material. R. at p. 301.
There is a specific e-mail from Darren Jewkes to several employees of the ISPFS. Mr.
Jewkes states:

"I am not sure ifI dare ask, but are there any other parts ofthe SOP that
you feel needs immediate attention, such as changing "will" to "may" or
"approximately" or doing away with "monthly" etc. (Jeremy here is
your chance:)." (emphasis added)
R. at p.215.
It is interesting to note that in this e-mail, Darren Jewkes actually uses the ":)" symbol.

Is this the way scientists should be acting, is this the way standards are developed?
Jeremy Johnson uses the words: " .... I am just suggesting putting in some wiggle room
language ... " and "cases are being tossed"( emphasis added). R. at p. 212. Where is the science
in using "wiggle room" language. The ISP concern seems to be that cases are being tossed.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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Whether cases get tossed really isn't relevant to a discussion as to the scientific standards for
breath testing.
There are also discussions regarding the use of the 0.2 solution and the need for linearity.
The only one who seems to be concerned about standards is David Laycock. He notes: "I just
don't think this is the time to cut back on quality standards." R. at p. 213. He goes into a
discussion about compliance with SOP. In fact, Jeremy Johnson notes:
"It is good scientific practice to check linearity because that lends credence
to accuracy of the numbers that the instrument generates."

R. at p. 215. (This e-mail relates to linearity and its application to the 0.20 solution)
Of course, then the e-mails note the ability to just put all sorts oflanguage in that protects
the operators so that someone can come in and testify around any problems. R. at p. 216. There
is also a discussion by Jeremy Johnston noting that a mandatory word like "must" would be
replaced with a discretionary word like "should". Again, where is the science? What would Judge
Lansing say about this? Jeremy Johnston uses the term "wiggle room" regarding the 0.20
language. R. at p. 217. The term "wiggle room" is used again regarding the simulator. R. at p.
218. Jared Olson, who is the Traffic Safety Resource Prosecutor for the Idaho Prosecuting
Attorneys Association, seems to be instrumental in making changes. Why a non-scientist
prosecutor is involved in any process involving generating standards must be considered suspect.
There is also a discussion involving Skylar Anderson and the use of the word "approximately".
He notes that he thinks the word "approximately" creates ambiguity in the method and creates
room for debate regarding when a performance verification is valid. He notes, "In this forensic
lab, we all have strict deadlines regarding when we can use a solution and 1 think BTSs are
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responsible enough to be held to a strict standard." R. at p. 233.
Anne Nord, states: "I want to thank both of you for all the work you have put in on these.
1 hope we start seeing the payoff soon and some of these issues we have been having with court
interpretations will go away." R. at p. 237. Why is ISPFS worrying about court decisions instead
of simply making scientific standards? It is obvious that ISPFS is not interested in science.
ISPFS is interested in convicting DUr drivers. Christine Starr, who is a prosecutor, has also had
input into the development ofthe standards. Her scientific background is not known. Most likely,
she has none since she is prosecutor. Jeremy Johnston notes: "I think we should limit it to police
officers and attorneys. Defense might try to use something in the e-mail to their advantage if they
find about it before the officers and prosecutors." R. at p. 248.
There is a discussion with Jeremy Johnston noting that he does not want the guidelines
to read as mandatory because he knows some BTSs use the nuclear approach and change solutions
if they get an initial failed series of tests. R. at p. 251. So again, how can the current SOP be
mandatory. Standards are not guidelines. The holding in State v. Bell, (CL App. 1988), supra,
does not support the current SOP as a standard. The current SOP is written so that nothing is
mandatory.
Jared Olson, asks questions about the term "calendar month" and the use of the word
"should" and noted that the procedure is a suggestion. R. at p. 252. Jeremy Johnston decides that
he can manipulate the requirements regarding the two samples requirement being approximately
two (2) minutes apart.

R. at p. 260. On August 24, 2010, Jesse Avery asks a question:

"According to 5.l.2 of the Sop's there should be an air blank between the 2 verification checks
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on a lifeloc. The lifeloc does not perform an air blank when doing a wet check. Is there something
else we need to be doing?" R. at p. 261. Matthew Garnette notes on August 24,2010: "I just
talked to Jared and he is going to have a few more prosecutors read the SOP over and he may
have a few more comments." R. at p. 263.
Again, why is ISPFS asking prosecutors for input regarding scientific standards. On
August 25 th 2010, Jared Olsen says:
"As a disclaimer, I recognize that there is absolutely no way the SOPs can
be constructed in a way that will not result in attacks in court. " (emphasis
added)

R. at p. 265.
With regard to the August 25 th e-mail, Jeremy Johnson respond. R. at pp. 265-269. The
court can note the discussion regarding the 0.8 solution, the 0.2 solution, the term "calendar
month" and Jeremy Johnson's concern about Clark & Feeney coming up with a "legit
argument" for the term "routinely". Jeremy Johnston also notes: "J removed the "open door

suggestions" and just left if [sic] vague." R. at p. 2687. Jeremy Johnson decides that he is going
to explain the scientific standards he has developed as follows: "I thought that I had added
enough weasel words to allow for different jurisdictions to use their own policies and beliefs to
decide." (emphasis added). R. at p. 268.
There is a discussion about that word "should" in that it is not being mandatory; it simply
allows for best practices as opposed to an actual standard. R. at p. 269.
Jared Olsen writes about the "real science" behind the changes to SOPs:
"It would be good to get comments from some of the BTS' s, prosecutors in
different jurisdictions and probably most importantly your own AGs who
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could forward it on to the appellate division who could offer some excellent
insight. I recognize this is not a requirement of ISPFS and I just want to
reaffirm my appreciation that you would allow me to comment at all. J see
only benefits by us working together. So thanks again, and please let me
know if you have questions or ifJ can be of further assistance."
R. at p. 275.
Again, why involve prosecutors, attorney generals, and the appellate division of the
attorney generals' office in the development of legal standards. ISPFS has not developed any
scientific standards, it's simply developing "weasel words".

The court should make a

determination that the "standards" in place on January 16,2011, do not meet the requirements of

I.e. § 18-8004(4) and the holding in State v. Bell, supra.

Finally, the breath testing specialist and

operator in this particular case indicated that he had not been trained or certified on the SOP that
was put into effect on November 1,2010. Therefore, he could not meet the standards set out in
Masterson v. Department of Transportation, 150 Idaho 126, 244 P .3d 625 (Ct. App. 20 10).
SOP Section 5.1.4.1 regarding the 0.20 performance verification not being routinely used
for "this purpose", has to apply to breath tests below a 0.20. What else could it possibly mean?
The Court also has to question exactly what SOP, section 5.1.1 means. It states as follows: "The
Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 portable breath testing instrument performance verification is run
using approximately 0.08 and/or 0.20 performance verification solutions provided by and/or
approved by ISPFS ." (emphasis added) Motion Hearing Exhibit 3 (SOP p. 10 of21). What does
the use of the word "approximately" mean in the context of this provision?
The State can not argue against the rule of lenity or common sense in the application of
the science oflinearity in breath testing. Cases from other parts of the country also examine the
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need for linearity in breath testing at different intoxication levels. See State v. Holland, 27 A.3d
1212 (App. Division N.J. 2011).
It is hard to argue that the current SOP is any sort of standard considering all of the

"should"s and "approximately"s that are set out in this current SOP. Exhibit 3. There is no
science behind any of the SOP changes. Attached and marked as Exhibit "A" to the reply brief
are the prior SOPs from August 20 and 27,2010. R. at pp. 551-592. Why have there been years
of mandatory requirements regarding the 15 minute observation period and now all of a sudden,
Idaho has discretionary provisions regarding the 15 minute observation period.
CONCLUSION
The trial court failed to act as a gatekeeper regarding the field sobriety tests. Not every
problem goes to the weight, therefore, the filed sobriety test should have been suppressed. The
breath test should have been suppressed because of the failure to have a proper observation period
and because of the failure to use the correct solution for performance verification. The SOP
currently used by the ISPFS docs not comply with the requirements for scientific standards set out
in l.e. § 18-8004(4). The trial court should have suppressed the breath results because of the lack
of scientific standards. The case should be remanded to the trial court.
DATED this

day of August, 2012.
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP

Charles M. Stroschein, a member of
the firm. Attorneys for Appellant.
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